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Philosophy, the "love of wisdom," becomes troublesome when friends and 
truth conflict. Aristotle responded to Plato that, especially when considering 
the good, both are dear, but our duty "requires us to honor truth above our 
friends."1 Baird Callicott is a longtime friend whose philosophy I much re-
spect, but the truth is dearer than Callicott. Because Callicott is also a 
Platonist scholar, he will remember the Aristotelian duty to prefer truth to 
friendship. Callicott, although a dear friend, is I fear, a doubtful guide at 
rather critical turning points and has gotten himself lost. He cannot find val-
ues in nature, not intrinsically. Indeed, at times he cannot find nature at all, 
not original nature, only a nature commingled with culture. So, paradoxically, 
we need to get Callicott, although he thinks of himself as a naturalist, really 
naturalized. 
A pity, too, that he loses his way, because he and I travel together over 
much of the landscape of environmental philosophy and policy, unfamiliar 
terrain that he and I (and increasingly many others) have been exploring for a 
quarter of a century. I cannot follow him in his arguments (1) about nature 
and culture, or (2) about intrinsic natural value. All good scholars know that 
an attack on argument differs from an attack on persons. Because Callicott 
earlier took it upon himself to "deconstruct Rolston,"2 perhaps now it is my 
turn to "reconstruct Callicott." 
NATURE AND CULTURE 
Callicott is anxious not to be a dualist, especially not a Cartesian dualist, 
which he thinks characterizes Enlightenment and modern thought and is one 
of the causes of environmental crises. Thinkers who distinguish between na-
ture and culture are such dualists, working in the legacy of matter and mind 
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because they think that the cultures produced deliberately by human minds 
are something different from the productions of spontaneous nature, the lat-
ter resulting from the self-organizing causal processes of energetic matter. 
Callicott desires a new concept of nature that includes culture. "The mod-
ern picture of nature is false and its historical tenure has been pernicious. A 
new dynamic and systemic postmodern concept of nature, which includes 
rather than excludes human beings, is presently taking shape."3 He would 
probably say he wishes to naturalize culture. Callicott puts this provocatively: 
"We are animals ourselves, large omnivorous primates, very precocious to be 
sure, but just big monkeys, nevertheless. We are therefore a part of nature, 
not set apart from it. Chicago is no less a phenomenon of nature than is the 
Great Barrier Reef."4 That ought to cure us from the "sharp dichotomy be-
tween man and nature," which has too long been a feature alike of religion 
and philosophy, "both wellsprings of the Western intellectual heritage."5 
If one is a metaphysical naturalist, as Callicott seems to be, then whatever 
is, is natural. In this respect he does not differ from many modernists, who are 
often also metaphysical naturalists, as some ancient thinkers also were. In this 
sense, the word natural has no contrast class, at least none occupied by any 
existing thing. Other metaphysicians might hold, for example, that the super-
natural exists, contrasting with the natural. There might be supernatural 
things going on in Chicago, in the churches. But Callicott is not entering this 
debate. He wants to claim, as a helpful insight in environmental ethics, that 
humans are natural, their culture (exemplified in Chicago) is quite natural (as 
much as the Great Barrier Reef). Realizing this "might even help to dissemi-
nate broadly an ecological world view and an associated environmental 
ethics."6 
The trouble is that, outside of metaphysics, a word becomes useless if it has 
no contrast class. Naturalizing everything delimits nothing. In environmental 
ethics it seems rather necessary to mark off what happens in wild spontaneous 
nature from what happens as a result of humans in their cultural activities, 
that is, in significant measure at least, to set humans apart from nature, 
Otherwise, we are not going to get any helpful analysis, such as might guide 
human conduct, by inquiring whether x is natural because any and all cultural 
activities will be natural activities as well (setting aside any supernatural 
events). 
Naturalizing everything overnaturalizes too much. The products of Chi-
cago industries, such as compact disks and Styrofoam cups, are natural just as 
much as coral reefs with their polyps and fishes. Corporate executives decid-
ing to break the standards of the Clean Water Act and polluting Lake Michi-
gan, are behaving in accord with nature as much as those deciding to meet or 
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exceed the standards to preserve the integrity of the waters. Or as clams feed-
ing underwater off the coast of Australia, 
Callicott is sensitive to this problem, and he separates desirable from unde-
sirable human behaviors by asking whether they are healthy, not whether they 
are natural (because they are all natural). Doubtless that will give some of the 
needed guidance. But whose health do we seek? Our human health? Callicott 
replies, rather, that we seek ecosystem health, assuming that this supports 
human health, which is ordinarily a quite reasonable assumption. Health is 
not just a skin-in matter; it is a skin-out matter, One cannot be healthy in a 
sick environment. Aldo Leopold wrote of our "responsibility for the health of 
the land."7 
But human health might also permit or even require some rather radically 
transformed natural systems, making tall grass prairies into cornfields and 
short grass prairies into wheat fields. The prairies of the Midwest can be quite 
healthy ecosystems even if the whooping cranes go extinct. "An ecological 
system is healthy and free from 'distress syndrome' if it is stable and sustain-
able—that is, if it is active and it maintains its organization and autonomy 
over time and is resilient to stress."8 Yes, that sounds plausible and desirable, 
but where is the place for cultural alterations of landscapes? 
A disanalogy exists between humans wishing bodily health and landscape 
health. A person prefers bodily natural health. We repair breakdowns, but we 
do not rebuild the healthy body. We only go to doctors when we are sick. By 
contrast, we do not want entirely natural ecosystems, healthy though they 
might be, and nothing more. If we are to have any culture at all, especially a 
modern culture, we must transform wild nature into rebuilt environments, 
We constantly labor to make something better (judged by our cultural stan-
dards) out of wild nature, not just healing something sick. We do not revise 
our bodies as we revise wild nature. 
A flourishing culture requires revamping much of wild nature. However, if 
this goes too for, then the natural system can collapse. We have to identify a 
pristine biological integrity, wild healthy environments, present ideally in 
wilderness areas, hopefully in protected areas, and contrast that with a cultur-
ally modified biological health, which we will try to maintain all over the land-
scape. But all this requires the distinction between nature and culture that 
Callicott has denied us. 
Ought there to be any prairies saved for what they are in themselves, with 
a flourishing population of whooping cranes, preserved as healthy nature 
apart from its healthy support of culture and agriculture?  This question can- 
not be addressed without specifying in more detail whose health is involved; 
and, sometimes at least, the health of wild natural ecosystems and their mem- 
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bers may be at stake, not just that of humans in their cultures. This again re-
quires the forbidden distinguishing of nature from culture. The most we 
could do might be to include the cranes and the wild prairies somewhere in 
our desires for quality of life. But if we had some other desires, the cranes and 
the prairies could go, assuming we kept the healthy cornfields and wheat 
fields. 
Nature differs from culture, and vice versa, in ways we need to specify. The 
problem is that, anxious not to be a dualist, Callicott is not discriminating 
enough to see that although humans evolve out of nature and its processes, 
they significantly evolve out of it. That can confuse him and others into saying 
that humans are just natural because they are products of various natural laws 
and events operating through evolutionary history, and because their origins 
were natural, they continue to be natural. But that is to fall into a "nothing 
but" fallacy (more accurately, the genetic fallacy), which confuses what a 
thing now essentially is with what its historical origins once were. It cannot 
take emergence seriously. Environmental philosophy needs to see the differ- 
ence in being human, and only after we get clear about that, do we also want 
to see the senses in which, although evolved out of it, culture has to remain in 
relative harmony with nature. 
Humans superimpose cultures on the wild nature out of which they once 
emerged with radical innovations, leading to the contrast we regularly make 
in ordinary language, between the natural and the artifacted, between a clam 
in the Great Barrier Reef and a Styrofoam cup in Chicago, The difference in 
ordinary language is catching something significant, something of which we 
need to take account (regardless of whether one is a metaphysical naturalist), 
Culture does introduce emergent novelties not previously present in wild 
nature. 
Information in wild nature travels intergenerationally on genes; informa-
tion in culture travels neurally as persons are educated into transmissible cul-
tures. Although the higher animals can learn limited behaviors from parents 
and conspecifics, animals do not form cumulative transmissible cultures. In 
nature, the coping skills are coded on chromosomes. In culture, the skills are 
coded in craftsman's traditions, religious rituals, or technology manuals. 
Information acquired during an organism's lifetime is not transmitted genet-
ically; the essence of culture is acquired information transmitted to the next 
generation. 
Information transfer in culture can be several orders of magnitude faster 
and overleap genetic lines. A typical couple may have only two or three chil-
dren who inherit their genetic information. But those children are educated 
by taking classes from dozens of teachers, by reading hundreds of books, 
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using libraries with tens of thousands of books, written by authors to whom 
they are genetically quite unrelated and who may have been dead for cen-
turies. The children learn from television programs with information coining 
from all over the world. A human being develops typically in one of some ten 
thousand cultures, inheriting a heritage that is historically conditioned, per-
petuated by language, conventionally established, using symbols with locally 
effective meanings. Cultures may exchange ideas; sometimes people are 
reared at the crossroads of cultures; well-educated persons choose and criti-
cize their cultures. 
Animals are what they are genetically, instinctively, and environmentally 
without any options in what they shall be at all, even if they do make some 
limited choices. Humans have myriad lifestyle options, evidenced by their cul-
tures, and each human makes daily decisions that affect his or her character. 
The highly deliberative character of human actions is without real precedent 
in nature, even though animals may have some precursor options in what they 
shall do. Natural selection pressures are relaxed in culture. As a result of their 
reflective deliberations, humans help each other out compassionately with 
charity, affirmative action, or Head Start programs. They study medicine to 
cure their bodily diseases. The determinants of animal and plant behavior, 
much less the determinants of climate or nutrient recycling, are never anthro-
pological, political, economic, technological, scientific, philosophical, ethical, 
or religious. Little or nothing in wild nature approaches all this. If we are 
going to evaluate what natural and cultural values we want to treasure, we 
must appreciate and criticize human affairs with insight into their radically 
different character. 
We might want, for instance, to insist, as I will in the argument to follow, 
contra Callicott, that intrinsic wild values exist that are not human values. Just 
because the human presence is so radically different, humans ought some-
times to draw back and let nature be. If so, we will have to debate whether all 
values are anthropocentric (human-centered), as Callicott thinks not, or an-
thropogenic (human-generated), as Callicott thinks—or at least used to 
think. But all this is quite outside the capacity of plants and animals. Humans 
can and ought see outside their own sector; they can relate their species self- 
interest to other natural values. And only humans have conscience enough to 
do this; indeed, it seems likely that only humans have conscience at all. 
These contrasts between nature and culture were not always as bold as they 
now are. Once upon a time, culture evolved out of nature. The early hunter- 
gatherers had transmissible cultures but, sometimes, were not much different 
in their ecological effects from the wild predators and omnivores among 
whom they moved. Cultural discoveries are cumulatively transmissible; we 
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would expect early cultures to have limited technologies. As culture grows, 
more and more power accumulates to rebuild and alter nature, more skills 
and information are transmitted. A few aboriginal peoples may remain today, 
with low-power technologies, although even they probably have accumulated 
rather complex cultures. But we now do not and cannot live in such a twilight 
society. Any society that we envision must be scientifically sophisticated, tech-
nologically advanced, globally oriented, as well as (we hope) just and charita-
ble, caring for universal human rights and for biospheric values. This society 
will try to fit itself in intelligently with the ecosystemic processes on which it is 
superposed. But they are not going to be helped in doing so by thinking of 
themselves as nothing but precocious monkeys in a Chicago jungle. Over- 
naturalizing human affairs is not the answer. 
INTRINSIC NATURAL VALUE 
Although Callicott is resolute about not being a dualist and separating hu-
mans from nature, he nevertheless makes a rather striking separation between 
humans and plants or animals. According to his value theory, nature comes to 
have intrinsic value only on human encounter and habitation. At least that has 
been his characteristic claim, although as we see later, he sometimes modifies 
it to include some related vertebrates. This first connects humans with nature 
and that seems promising, but, alas, this also prevents disconnecting nature 
from humans so that it can have any intrinsic value on its own—and that is 
disconcerting. Nature only comes to have such value when humans take it up 
into their experience. 
Suddenly, the dichotomy conies back with a vengeance. Only humans pro-
duce value; wild nature is intrinsically valueless without humans. All it has 
without humans is the potential to be evaluated by humans, who, if and when 
they appear, may incline, sometimes, to value nature in noninstrumental 
ways. Maybe there is no metaphysical difference of substance or process; 
human activities and those in wild nature are equally natural. But there is an 
axiological difference of value; only humans can value anything in this way. 
That is quite separatist. Maybe we humans are metaphysically different after 
all, in process if nor in substance, if we have such a remarkably different 
capacity. 
Callicott is quite clear about our unique value-ability. All intrinsic value is 
"grounded in human feelings" but is "projected" onto the natural object that 
"excites" the value. "Intrinsic value ultimately depends upon human valuers." 
"Value depends upon human sentiments."9  We humans can and ought place 
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such value on natural things, at times, but there is no value already in place 
before we come. Intrinsic value is our construct, interactively with nature, but 
not something discovered that was there before we came, "There can be no 
value apart from an evaluator, ... all value is as it were in the eye of the be-
holder [and]... therefore, is humanly dependent."10 Such value is "anthro-
pogenic."11 
The source of all value is human consciousness, but it by no means 
follows that the locus of all value is consciousness itself. ...  An in- 
trinsically valuable thing on this reading is valuable for its own sake, 
for itself, but it is not valuable in itself, i.e. completely independently 
of any consciousness, since no value can in principle ... be alto-
gether independent of a valuing consciousness. ... Value is, as it 
were, projected onto natural objects or events by the subjective feel-
ings of observers. If all consciousness were annihilated at a stroke, 
there would be no good and evil, no beauty and ugliness, no right 
and wrong; only impassive phenomena would remain.12 
This, Callicott says, is a "truncated sense" of value where "'intrinsic value' retains 
only half its traditional meaning." At the same time, "value is, to be sure, 
humanly conferred, but not necessarily homocentric."13 
The word project here needs analysis. Motion picture projectors project an 
image when light travels from the projector to the screen, but we are not here 
to think of a value-bestowing ray. Nothing travels from the human valuer to 
the natural object. Rather, humans value trees somewhat like they color them 
green. The greenness of the tree is in my head, but it looks as though the tree 
is green. Out there are only electromagnetic waves of 550 nanometers. The 
greenness is projected, manufactured in my head and apparently hung onto 
the tree. Dogs, with black and white vision, project no greenness onto the 
same tree. I have no options about the greenness; I do have options about the 
valuing—to some extent. I can see the tree as board-feet of timber or a poem 
(Joyce Kilmer), I can value it as an instrument to satisfy my desires or I can see 
it as having intrinsic value. 
In all this nothing travels from the human to the tree. The "projection" is 
better called a "translation." The "value conferring" does not transmit any-
thing to the tree, and in that sense the value never really gets outside of the 
human head. The tree is sending and the human is receiving. The human is 
not really doing any sending, nor the tree any receiving. The incoming signals 
from the tree are "translated" as green, and so the tree appears green. In one 
sense this is an illusion; in another it is not. There is no experience of green in 
the tree, but there is ample reality (radiation) out there, behind and exciting 
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my experience. My coloring the tree green is mapping what is really there, al-
though my mind is translating as it maps. My "finding" of intrinsic value in 
nature is to be modeled after my "finding" green. (Green insects, camou-
flaged on the leaves, are protected from predators who, although they have 
no experience of green, have other sense modalities that catch electromag-
netic signals and distinguish wavelengths). 
To say that a natural x is valuable means that x is able to be valued if and 
when (human) valuers come along, but x has this property whether humans 
(or other valuers) ever arrive. To say that something is intrinsically valuable 
means that it is of such kind that were valuers to arrive they might value it in-
trinsically rather than instrumentally. The trilobites that went extinct before 
humans evolved were (potentially) intrinsically valuable. Undiscovered 
species on Earth now or on uninhabited planets are intrinsically valuable in 
this potential sense. 
By this account no actual value ownership is autonomous to the valued and 
valuable wildflower; there is a value ignition when humans come. The object 
plays its necessary part, although this is not sufficient without the subject. 
Out there, apart from humans, there is only tta range of potential values in na-
ture actualizable upon interaction with consciousness."14 
Notice that, although anthropogenic, value is not necessarily anthro- 
pocentric. Value is not self-regarding, or even human-regarding, merely, al-
though it is human-generated (anthropogenic). It is not centered on human 
well-being, although it is still tethered to human experience. Sometimes hu-
mans value nature instrumentally, as when they want soil to grow crops. 
Sometimes humans value nature intrinsically, as when they save endangered 
lemurs, refusing to convert a lemur forest sanctuary into cropland. But this is 
always humans doing the valuation: anthropocentric if the decision is for 
croplands, but still anthropogenic if the decision is for lemurs. Wild nature is 
value free and only becomes valuable when humans evaluate it. Also, humans 
err; they can (and often do) value wildflowers and lemurs insufficiently; they 
fail to appreciate how they can and ought to value these things in themselves. 
This compromise account is certainly to be welcomed over less enlight-
ened humanistic accounts. It affords enormously more environmental respect 
and protection than weaker theories. Only human beings value (evaluate) 
natural things; but it does not follow that when human beings do value (eval-
uate) things, they conclude that only humans have value. Man is the only 
measurer of things, but man does not have to make himself the only measure 
he uses. If we do, we will miss much richness in natural values. Still, values in 
nature have in fact been "truncated," and that is unwelcome; we may still be 
missing much of the richness of value in nature.  This is not yet a genuinely bi- 
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ological or ecological theory of value, but residually a psychological one, 
which has to keep these humanistic bridges connecting with people as it en-
ters the terrain of environmental ethics. Surely it is anomalous to have the 
philosopher who values the "land" so much, who urges a "land ethic" so in- 
tensely, finding nothing of value in the "land" at all, until we humans place or 
project it there. 
The problem is first one of language. Callicott may use the language of 
valuing nature for itself, but this is misleading; value is always and only rela-
tional with humans one of the relata. Despite the language of value projection 
and conferral, if we try to take the term intrinsic seriously, this cannot refer to 
anything the object gains, to something within ("intra") the object because 
the human subject does not really project anything to the natural object. We 
have only this "truncated sense" of intrinsic. All the attributes under consid-
eration are objectively there before humans come, but the attribution of value 
is subjective. The object causally affects the subject, who is excited by the in-
coming data and translates this as value, after which the object appears as hav-
ing value (and color). But nothing is really added intrinsically to the object at 
all; everything in the object remains what it before was. Despite the language 
that humans are the source of value that they locate in the natural object, no 
value is really located there. The only new event is that these properties are 
registered in—translated into felt values by—the perceptual apparatus of the 
beholder. 
The tern intrinsic, although claimed in a truncated sense for this view, is 
misleading. What is really meant is better specified by the term extrinsic15  the 
ex indicating the external, anthropogenic coagulation of the value, which is 
not in, intrinsic, internal to the nonsentient organism, even though this 
value, once-generated, is apparently conferred on the organism. This value is 
noncontributory in the sense that it is not used in some human reference 
frame, that is, not possessed in a rebuilt environment. The value is accepted, 
reflected, enjoyed just as it is. Still, human consciousness realizes this value in 
the organism, which the organism did not have before, but that on encounter 
with humans, it does come to have extrinsically. 
The value-generating event is something like the light in a refrigerator—it 
is only on when the door is opened. Values in flora and nonsentient fauna are 
only "on" when humans are perceiving them and otherwise "off." This is said 
to be the ignition, or projection, of value, hitherto only potentially present. 
There are only "potential instrumental and intrinsic values in nature ... 
awaiting actualization by a conscious physical subject."16 But is not this like 
looking for time in the clock that measures it, looking for a birthday party in 
the camera that photographs it? I seem to be assuming that, among all the 
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phenomena in the universe, only one sort of thing, psychological interest, 
produces actual value intrinsically, although I recognize that myriad things 
present in the world before, during, or after the presence of (human) valuers 
can excite such value. Actual value was not lost when the various species of 
trilobites went extinct, nor is value lost now when unknown species in tropi-
cal forests go extinct, bulldozed away unawares to humans. 
But this leaves us with an uneasy concern that, for all this seemingly gener-
ous talk about caring for others, about our placing value there, because it is 
only we who can place value anywhere, humans really do remain at the center 
of concern; their concern is central to having any value at all. Their concern is 
all that matters, and being concerned for animals or plants, or species or 
ecosystems that really do not matter in themselves is not always going to be 
easy. We are more likely to be concerned only if they matter to and for us, 
which places humans right back at the center. Nature is actually valuable only 
when it pleases, as well as serves, us. That seems to be the ultimate truth, even 
though we penultimately have placed intrinsic value on nature and take our 
pleasure enjoying these natural things for what they are in themselves. 
Without us there is no such pleasure taken in anything. What is value-able, 
able to value things, is people; nature is able to be valued only if such able 
people are there to do such valuing. Nature is not value-able—able to gener-
ate values—on its own, nor do plants and most animals have any such 
value-ability, on their own. Callicott has not really gotten his values natural-
ized, not yet. 
Callicott does enter a caveat about whether such valuing is done by hu-
mans only. Anyone who observes animals will soon see that man is not the 
only measure, or measurer, of things. Those lemurs, on which we chose to 
confer intrinsic value, may appreciate our favor; they will also take a dim view 
of any such anthropogenic theory, no matter how generous, because lemurs, 
all by themselves, value insects and fruits instrumentally as food to eat. They 
do not behave as if these were anthropogenic values at all. They were doing 
these things before any humans came to Madagascar approximately 1,500 
years ago. The value of the food they eat is not "humanly conferred." Lemurs 
cannot reflect on value theory, of course; they cannot self-consciously evalu-
ate their value theory, but they can behaviorally demonstrate what they value. 
And humans, who can reflect on value theory, ought to be able to see that the 
lemurs are not valuing anthropogenically at all. They have their own ends. 
There is autonomous intrinsic value, not just anthropogenic intrinsic value. 
Callicott has come to accept this point increasingly over the years; indeed 
he recognized this possibility from the start.17 Value, he now says is not always 
"anthropogenic"; it may sometimes be "vertebragenic, since nonhuman ani- 
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mals, all vertebrates at the very least, are conscious and therefore may be said, 
in the widest sense of the term, to value things."18 Well, that is a help because at 
least the vertebrates (including the lemurs) share in our ability to value 
things. But how do these fellow vertebrates value things? They value things 
instrumentally, no doubt, because they seek other plants and insects for food; 
they value water to drink, their dens for shelter, and so on. 
Do they value anything intrinsically? Callicott does not address this ques-
tion, but perhaps he would say (and I would agree) that a vertebrate animal 
values its own life intrinsically. The lemur defends its life as a good of its own; 
it desires to live its own life. Such life is valued without further contributory 
reference, even if boa constrictors in turn make use of lemurs for food. 
Perhaps the lemur can value its young intrinsically because the mother lemur 
puts herself at risk to bear young and values the ongoing species line. 
Do these nonhuman vertebrates have our human capacity to place intrinsic 
value on other individual plants and animals, on species, or ecosystems other 
than themselves? Presumably not. No lemur is ever going to become con-
cerned about valuing boa constrictors for what they are in themselves or sav-
ing that species line. Any vertebragenic value is going to be vertebracentric for 
just that species and no further. So it is humans alone who have this remark-
able ability to value intrinsically something other than themselves. 
Meanwhile, the vertebrates comprise a very small fraction of the animals, 
much less of the living things. What are we to say of the insects, or the worms, 
or the trees, or the wildflowers? Bees cannot value honey unless we can find 
enough neurons in them to provide consciousness. Plants cannot value their 
seeds, or the lives they defend, because they have no vertebrae or neurons at 
ail. When we run out of psychological experience, value is over. That still 
leaves most of the world valueless because the vertebrates are only about 4 
percent of the described species. Indeed, because most as yet undescribed 
species are not vertebrates and because the numbers of individuals in verte-
brate species is typically much lower than the numbers of individuals in inver-
tebrate species, or in plant species, real valuers form only some minuscule 
fraction of the living organisms on Earth. Nearly everything on Earth is still 
quite valueless, unless and until these humans come along and place intrinsic 
value there. As Callicott admits, until humans do this, "there simply is no in-
herent or intrinsic value in nature."19 
All this seems to fall short of valuing what an ecosystem is in itself, a 
healthy, lively place whether or not we humans are around, full of animals and 
plants, including vertebrates, who are defending their own lives for what they 
are in themselves, each with their own modes of coping, only a few of whom 
have the capacity for consciously evaluating what they are doing. A powerful 
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emotion when leaving culture to return to nature is the sense of entrance into 
a natural place flourishing independently of any human presence. The forces 
by which natural systems run are not human forces; they are the biological 
and physical forces that have generated the world. Wild creatures are selected 
for their fitness in the places they inhabit; the wilderness is a complex tapestry 
of values with each living thing defending itself, with vital needs, and the 
whole system a network in which goods are circulated round and integrated 
into other goods through both conflict and complementarity. The natural 
history that envelops us is of value, not only because we humans place value 
there, but because value is there regardless of whether we value it. 
By now we begin to suspect that the anthropogenic account of intrinsic 
value is a strained saving of what is really an inadequate paradigm, that of the 
subjectivity of value conferral. A thoroughgoing value theory in environmen-
tal ethics is more radical than this; it fully values the objective roots of value 
with or without their fruits in subjectivity. Sometimes to be radical is also to 
be simpler. The anthropogenic theory of intrinsic value insists on the subjec-
tivity of value conferral while trying hard to preserve the object with all its 
properties. It admits that the exciting object is necessary for generating value. 
A simpler, less anthropically based, more biocentric theory holds that some 
values are objectively there, discovered rather than generated by the subjectivist 
valuer. A fully objective environmental ethics can quite enjoy a "translator" 
when subjective appreciators of value appear. It can value such appreciation 
(experienced respect) more highly than untranslated objective value. Value 
appreciates (increases) with humans. But such an ethic does not insist on a 
human translator for value to be present throughout 99 percent of the cre-
ation. That commits a fallacy of the misplaced location of values. It has not yet 
naturalized value. 
Trees may not be colored without a perceiver, but they do exist per se. Is 
their value like their color or their existence? Trees have their norms and 
needs, defenses, programs; these are factors in their existence, and so value, 
coupling with existence defended, is not an analog of color after all. Trees do 
appear to be green and perhaps we do not want to call the electromagnetic 
waves actually there "greenness." Trees are also valuable in themselves, able to 
value themselves; they stand on their own. By contrast with "greenness," we 
do want to say that "treeness" is objectively there, the tree with its life project 
defended. We want to call this valuable regardless of what "seems" to us. 
Some values are already there, discovered not generated by the valuer because 
the first project here is really the natural object, nature's project; the principal 
projecting is nature creating formed integrity. Beside this, the human project-
ing of value is an epiphenomenon. The theory of anthropogenic intrinsic 
value needs to give place to a theory of autonomous intrinsic value. 
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Natural selection picks out whatever traits an organism has that are valu-
able to it, relative to its survival. When natural selection has been at work 
gathering these traits into an organism, that organism is able to value on the 
basis of those traits. It is a valuing organism, even if the organism is not a sen-
tient valuer, much less vertebrate, much less a human evaluator. And those 
traits, although picked out by natural selection, are innate in the organism, 
that is, stored in its genes. Dissociating the idea of value from natural selec-
tion is difficult. 
Any sentient, psychogenic, vertebragenic, or anthropogenic theory of 
value has got to argue away all such natural selection as not dealing with 
"real" value at all, but mere function. Those arguments are, in the end, more 
likely to be stipulations than real arguments. If you stipulate that valuing must 
be felt valuing, that there must be somebody there, some subject of a life, 
then trees are not able to value; their leaves and thorns are no good to them 
and that is so by your definition. But what someone advocating a "land 
ethic," with its focus on members of biotic communities, wishes to examine is 
whether that definition, faced with the facts of biology, is plausible. Perhaps 
the sentientist definition covers correctly but narrowly certain kinds of higher 
animal valuing, namely that done by humans and their vertebrate relatives, 
and omits all the rest. 
Callicott seems to be misled by thinking that all relationships can be mod-
eled after a particular reading of quantum theory in which the observer inter-
acts with what is observed. From this he draws sweeping conclusions: 
Mass and motion, color and flavor, good and evil, beauty and ugli- 
ness, all alike, are equally potentialities which are actualized in rela- 
tion to us or to similarly constituted organisms. ...  No properties in 
nature are strictly intrinsic, that is, ontologically objective and inde-
pendent of consciousness. Borrowing now from the vocabulary of 
quantum theory, we may assert, rather, that values are virtual. Virtual 
value is an ontological category encompassing all values. Within its 
purview fall the entire spectrum of instrumental and inherent values. 
... Inherent value is a virtual value in nature actualized upon inter-
action with consciousness.20 
That is implausible. Yes, the tree is not experienced as colored green until in-
teracting with consciousness. But the tree is photosynthesizing. The activity 
and the energy captured and stored metabolically is valuable to the tree quite 
ontologically objectively and independently of any consciousness, human or 
otherwise. There is nothing virtual about that. Perhaps the food in the refrig-
erator is not colored until we open the door; perhaps it is not tasty until we 
consume it. But the energy stored in the potatoes was there in the dark, and it 
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was first put into the potato underground because it was of value to the plant, 
whether any humans or other conscious evaluators even came on scene. 
Callicott holds that in a modern scientific perspective, a tree's goodness is 
not more objective than its greenness. If one "grants that there are indepen-
dent ('free-standing') objects and correspondingly independent subjects, and 
primary qualities and secondary qualities... all the argument in the world to 
the effect that goodness is more objective than greenness is going to look like 
a magic show, brought off with smoke and mirrors."21 Callicott wishes to be 
postmodern rather than modern, of course, but he continues the same line of 
argument. "After thinking very hard, during the mid-1980s, about the ontol-
ogy of value finally I came reluctantly to the conclusion that intrinsic value 
cannot exist objectively."22   There is "no 'truth' or 'falsity' to value judg- 
ments, since there are no objective or intrinsic values to which value judg-
ments may or may not correspond."23 
But my reply is that photosynthesis is indeed more objective than green-
ness, and that this is exactly what modern science teaches, not to be undone 
by some postmodern smoke and mirrors. Photosynthesis is quite true, and 
quite valuable to the tree, and all this quite objective. Quantum theory does 
not make photosynthesis subjective in the slightest. What is good for a tree 
(nitrogen, carbon dioxide, water) is observer-independent. This leads at once  
to the fact that the good of the tree (whether it is injured or healthy) is equally 
objective. The tree's defense of its own life, its coping based on DNA coding, 
is quite objective (even if, no doubt, there is some observer construction in 
the theories and instruments by which all this is known). The sequoia tree 
has, after all, been there 2,000 years, whether any green-experiencing humans 
were around. Sequoia sempervirens, the species line, has been around several 
million years, with each of its individual sequoia trees defending a good of 
their kind. 
Those who value wild nature, having discovered the intrinsic natural values 
that we have been defending, wish to preserve natural processes as well as nat-
ural products. Humans can and ought to see outside their own sector and af-
firm nonanthropogenic, noncultural values. Only humans have the cognitive 
power to erect cultures that destroy wild nature. Humans must, and ought to, 
destroy wilderness when they build their cultures; neither agricultural nor 
urban lands can be wilderness. At the same time, only humans have con-
science. That conscience emerges for the, building of culture to relate humans 
to other humans with justice and love, but it also emerges—so environmental 
ethicists are now arguing—for the relating of humans to nature, to the larger 
community of life on the planet. That relationship, governed by conscience 
(and also by pragmatic self-interest), requires a harmonious blending of na- 
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ture and culture, where this is possible. The same conscience also generates a 
duty that respects wild nature at some times and places for values present 
there independently of humans. 
So the problem with Callicott, repeatedly, is to get his environmental phi-
losophy really naturalized. He so resolutely opposes dichotomizing humans 
and nature that he cannot find any integrity for nature on its own. He re-
mains, for a would-be naturalist, surprisingly humanistic—with people pro-
jecting their values onto nature, with people managing their landscapes. No 
doubt this is indeed required; it is half the truth in environmental ethics. But 
it is not the whole truth. 
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